Upgrading to v0.26.12

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v0.26.12 fixes a session-token disclosure present since the v0.25 line, and makes Rodauth’s active-session table load-bearing on every authenticated request in full authentication mode. There is no schema migration and no dependency change, so rollback is a tag swap.

Upgrading from a release earlier than v0.26.11? Work forward through the guides for the releases you are skipping, then return here. From v0.22 or v0.23, start with v0.24.0. From anywhere in the v0.26 line, complete v0.26.6 and then v0.26.11. Each of those carries configuration work this guide assumes is already done.

Before You Start

Back up Redis/Valkey and, in full mode, the authentication database.
Record your current tag: docker compose exec app ots version (or your OTS_IMAGE_TAG).
Note your AUTHENTICATION_MODE. Most of this guide applies only to full (see Simple or Full if you are unsure which mode you run).
In full mode, note how your authentication database is reached — direct, pooler, or failover pair — and who is paged when it goes down. Step 1 depends on it.

What Changes

Area	Change	Action required?
Response headers	Router `404`/`500` fallbacks no longer replay other requests’ `Set-Cookie`	Yes — decide on a session sweep
Full-mode sessions	Every authenticated request checks the active-session row; an unreachable authdb refuses the request	Yes — verify authdb availability
Session deadlines	Inactivity 24h → 72h, now enforced per request; 30-day lifetime enforced per request	No, but expect sign-outs
Account deletion	Full-mode Settings deletion posts to `/auth/close-account`	Only if you filter paths at a proxy
Colonel API	`details.cache` removed, `refresh=1` ignored, `pagination.capped` added	Only if you script the Colonel API
Audit log	Preview and no-change rows carry `dry_run: true` and `outcome: 'no_change'`	Only if you consume `LOG_AUDIT_SYSLOG`
New config	`RODAUTH_ADMIN_URL` (optional, outbound links only)	No

The Upgrade Checklist

Steps 1 and 2 are ordered by dependency: an authdb that cannot answer will refuse every signed-in request, which looks like the site being down, so establish that first.

Only in full mode — confirm the authentication database is highly available. Every authenticated request now runs one indexed SELECT on account_active_session_keys, plus a throttled last_use write at most once per 300 seconds per session. When the database cannot answer, the request is refused. Before this release an authdb outage left existing sessions working from Redis; it no longer does. Check connection-pool headroom for your request rate, and add an alert on [active_session_gate] authdb unreachable.

Setting AUTH_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_ENABLED=false removes this dependency, but it is a deploy-time product decision, not an incident toggle. With it off, Rodauth writes no active-session rows and stamps no join key at login, so user-driven revocation (the sessions card, “sign out everywhere”, Rodauth Admin) has nothing to act on, and the 72-hour inactivity and 30-day lifetime deadlines are not enforced at all: a Rack session that keeps being used lives indefinitely. Operator-driven revocation (ots sessions revoke-all, the Colonel console, password and email change) still deletes the Redis blob and keeps working. Sessions minted while the flag was off carry no join key and stay exempt from the gate after it is turned back on, until their 24-hour idle TTL clears them. Do not use it as an availability workaround.
Pull v0.26.12 and restart. No migration runs. Existing sessions signed in before v0.26.10 carry no join key, are deliberately exempt from the new gate, and age out on their own, so nobody is mass-logged-out on deploy.
Decide whether to revoke sessions. Before this release, a 404 or 500 served by the router fallback could return session cookies committed on earlier requests, to whoever hit that miss. Your access logs hold the fallback-response volume that tells you how exposed you were. To clear it: ots sessions revoke-all <customer> per account, or have users sign out everywhere.
Only if a proxy, WAF, or path allowlist sits in front of the app: confirm POST /auth/close-account reaches it. Full-mode account deletion moved there; /api/account/destroy remains the simple-mode path.
Only if you script the Colonel API: the Organizations list no longer sends a details.cache block and accepts refresh=1 without acting on it. Treat a response carrying pagination.capped: true as “there may be more”, not as a complete list.
Only if you consume the audit syslog stream: exclude rows carrying dry_run: true or outcome: 'no_change' from operator-action counts. These markers are now applied uniformly; email/sync_provider_feedback previews carry dry_run for the first time.

Verify

Sign in, then revoke that session from /account/settings/security/sessions in another browser. The first browser should be signed out on its next request, not at expiry.
In full mode, stop the authentication database on a staging tier. Requests should be refused and the log should read authdb unreachable ... (fail closed), not a revocation. Start it again; the same browser should work without signing in.
curl -sI https://<host>/definitely-not-a-route twice from two different clients. Neither response should carry a Set-Cookie belonging to the other.
If you set RODAUTH_ADMIN_URL, open a customer in the Colonel console — the Rodauth account should render as a link rather than plain text.

Config Mapping Reference

New configuration

# Base URL of the standalone Rodauth Admin instance. Optional, credential-free,
# and never requested from — the Colonel console only renders outbound links.
# Only meaningful in full auth mode; unset renders those links as plain text.
RODAUTH_ADMIN_URL=http://127.0.0.1:9292

Changed behavior

# Unchanged default (on). What changed is its reach. Before v0.26.12 the flag
# controlled whether Rodauth tracked sessions at all (rows, join-key stamp,
# /auth/active-sessions routes), but nothing outside those routes consulted the
# rows, and the settings card was hidden by a hardcoded `false` regardless. It
# now also gates per-request revocation enforcement, the two session deadlines,
# and (for the first time) whether the Active Sessions card is shown.
#
# Parsed as ENV['AUTH_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_ENABLED'] != 'false' — only the exact
# lowercase string 'false' disables it. 'False', '0', 'no' and 'off' leave it ON.
AUTH_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_ENABLED=true

The 72-hour inactivity deadline and the 30-day lifetime deadline are constants in Onetime::ActiveSessionGate. There is no environment variable for either.

Troubleshooting

The authentication database is unreachable. Look for [active_session_gate] authdb unreachable. This is the fail-closed path, not a revocation. Restore the database; sessions are honored again without a re-login.

Users are signed out after a weekend away

The 72-hour inactivity deadline is now enforced on every request rather than swept on the sessions page. Expected. The 30-day lifetime deadline behaves the same way.

Session revocation still doesn’t take effect

AUTH_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_ENABLED is set to false, or the mode is not full. With the flag off this affects user-driven revocation only; ots sessions revoke-all and the other operator-driven paths still work.

Account deletion from Account Settings still fails

In full mode it now posts to /auth/close-account. Confirm that path reaches the app through your proxy.

The Organizations list shows fewer rows than expected

Search is bounded now. Check pagination.capped in the response — true means the result stopped short deliberately. Narrow the search rather than paging for the rest.

Log lines about `last_use refresh on active-session row failed`

The write that keeps a session alive is failing. If it persists, live sessions will be signed out at the 72-hour deadline. Treat it as a database write-path problem, not a session problem.

Rollback

There is no migration, so rolling back is pinning OTS_IMAGE_TAG=v0.26.11 and restarting. RODAUTH_ADMIN_URL is inert on the older tag and can be left set.